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Abstract
We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety. Variety
seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous
purchase occasion. Using a three-stage Hotelling-type model, we show that the presence of variety seeking
consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium, thereby explaining some otherwise
counterintuitive findings in empirical research. We find that firms charge higher prices in Period 1 and lower
prices in Period 2. The lower price in Period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent
the variety seeking consumers from switching. Furthermore, we find that the observed switching in a market
may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers.
Finally, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher
consumer surplus. Surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers. Therefore,
the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market.
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Abstract
We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where con-
sumers seek variety. Variety seeking behavior is modeled as an increase in the
willingness-to-pay for the product not purchased on the previous purchase occasion.
Using a three stage Hotelling type model, we show that the presence of variety seek-
ing consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium. Furthermore,
we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true
magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers. Finally,
we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits
and a higher consumer surplus. Non-variety seeking consumers also gain from the
presence of variety seeking consumers.
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1 Introduction
Observed brand choice behavior suggests that some consumers avoid changes whereas
others prefer variety. Preference for variety, observed even in the absence of stock outs and
promotions (Bass, Pessemier and Lehmann 1972), is believed to indicate the presence of a
variety seeking trait (e.g., Givon 1984, Lattin and McAllister 1985), and these consumers
get satiated with the same product over time. Satiation with the most recent purchase
may lead to an increase in the attractiveness of the competing brand at the next purchase
occasion (McAlister 1982).
Marketing has a rich tradition of empirical research that allows us to estimate the ex-
tent of variety seeking in a market (e.g., Kahn, Kalwani and Morrison 1986, Trivedi, Bass
and Rao 1994), its impact on market share (Feinberg, Kahn and McAlister 1992), and
how companies could adapt their promotional strategies in the presence of consumers who
seek variety (e.g., Kahn and Raju 1991, Zhang, Krishna and Dhar 2000). More recently,
analytic modelers have also begun to examine how the presence of variety seeking cus-
tomers affects pricing decisions, and ultimately firm profits, in a competitive equilibrium
(Seetharaman and Che 2006).
We extend this tradition by developing a model that allows firms to also make po-
sitioning decisions (along with pricing decisions) in the context of a consumer behavior
model that we believe is somewhat less restrictive than the consumer models previously
used in this stream of research. Consequently, our analysis allows us to answer questions
that could not be addressed in the context of previous models. For example, one such
question is whether the presence of variety seeking consumers results in greater or lesser
product variety in equilibrium. While, it may appear that the presence of variety seeking
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consumers should result in more product variety, we find that this need not always be
the case when one considers a competitive context explicitly. Furthermore, while previous
research notes that the presence of variety seeking consumers might result in higher prices
and profits, we find that prices and profits are lower if there are enough consumers who
seek variety. This seems reasonable because in the absence of loyalty (consumer inertia),
one should intuitively expect the firms to make lower profits.
Klemperer (1987) uses switching costs to model variety. Seetharaman and Che (2006)
look at variety seeking in terms of staying cost. We model variety seeking (satiation)
through a relative reduction in the reservation price (willingness to pay) of the previously
purchased brand. Our model is different from Klemperer (1987) and Che and Seetharaman
(2006) on two additional dimensions.
• We do not restrict firms to locate at the extremes of the market. We model the
location decisions of the firm endogenously and solve for the equilibrium firm loca-
tions.
• Seetharaman and Che (2006) model variety seeking through a change in location.
Some consumers located at x in the first period changes location to (1− x) in the
second period. Klemperer (1987) assumes that preferences of a fraction of consumers
in Period 2 is independent of their preferences in Period 1. In contrast, in the model
proposed here, the maximum willingness to pay changes for a fraction of consumers
but each consumer is located at the same position on the Hotelling line across both
the time periods.
In the context of our model, we show that when some consumers seek variety, the de-
gree of product differentiation reduces in equilibrium, and firm prices are lower in Period
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2 and higher in Period 1. Van Trijp, Hoyer and Inman (1996) find that variety seeking
behavior is more likely to occur in situations where the perceived differences among the
alternatives are small. Our model suggests that this association may be observed due to
the fact that firms differentiate less in the presence of variety seeking consumers. The pre-
diction regarding prices is different than what has been obtained in Klemperer (1987) and
Seetharaman and Che (2006). We recognize however that ultimately which prediction is
more robust in what context can only be determined through a thorough empirical anal-
ysis. However, it is worthwhile noting that there are instances where recommendations
from prior research and observed firm behavior are consistent with our model predictions.
For example, our results resonate with the idea that rear-loaded promotions are superior
to front-loaded promotions in the presence of variety seeking customers (Zhang, Krishna
and Dhar, 2000). The rear loaded promotion effectively reduces the price that a consumer
needs to pay for a previously purchased brand making the competing brand less attractive
during the second period purchase. In terms of observed behavior, we have noted that
Newsweek magazine subscription prices to new consumers are higher than the renewal
prices paid by existing consumers (See Table 1). Reader’s Digest is another magazine
where renewal prices are lower than initial subscription prices. Renewal prices for many
software subscriptions are also often lower than the initial subscription prices. One such
example is Microsoft Developer Network. Microsoft manages its relationships with de-
velopers through its Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN). MSDN offers its Operating
Systems initial subscription at $699 where as the renewal price is only $499.1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We outline the key features of our
competitive model in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze the model and derive our main
1Source:http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/mar05/03-21VS2005PR.mspx
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results and outline the intuition behind the results. Section 4 presents the conclusions,
limitations and possible avenues for future research.
2 The Model
We use the Hotelling framework (Hotelling 1929) and assume that the market consists
of two symmetric firms A and B, each offering one product recognized by superscripts
A and B respectively. Consider the following sequence of decisions. In Period 0, firms
choose locations simultaneously. In Period 1, firms choose first period prices, pA1 and p
B
1
and consumers buy the product that maximizes their utility. In Period 2, firms choose
second period prices, pA2 and p
B
2 and each and every consumer again decides to buy the
product that maximizes their utility. Multi-period models have been used extensively in
marketing literature (e.g. Desai and Purohit 1999, Kim, Shi and Srinivasan 2001). The
specific model assumptions are described below in greater detail.
1. We assume that the ideal points of consumers are distributed uniformly in the unit
interval [-0.5, 0.5] and the total number of consumers is normalized to 1.
2. We assume that in Period 1, consumer reservation price is denoted by V , and is the
same for both products A and B. V is assumed to be sufficiently large so that all
consumers buy one of the two products in Period 1.
3. For a fraction θ consumers in the market, second period reservation prices increase
by ` for the product they did not buy in Period 1. Parameters θ and ` are assumed
to be exogenous to the model. These θ consumers are the variety seeking consumers.
More specifically, θ fraction of the consumers believe that the competing product
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will provide them with incremental utility (UA − V = UB − V = ` > 0 where UA
and UB represent the higher reservation price for the competing brand which they
did not purchase in the first period) in Period 2 over their choice in Period 1. These
θ consumers are distributed uniformly on the line segment [-0.5, 0.5].
4. The remaining (1− θ) consumers see both products to have identical reservation
prices in Period 2 as in Period 1. These consumers are also distributed uniformly
on the line segment [-0.5, 0.5].
5. Every consumer in the market buys one and only one unit from the firm which
provides them with the highest utility in that period.
6. Following Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Tyagi (2000), firms are not restricted to
locate within the interval of consumers’ ideal points i.e. within [-0.5, 0.5]. Firms
choose locations simultaneously. Thus our analysis, excludes the possibility of any
first mover advantage. We assume that Firm A is located to the left of Firm B and
these locations are denoted by a and b respectively.
7. The production cost for both firms is assumed to be identical and constant and is
assumed to be zero without loss of generality.
8. Transportation cost is assumed to be quadratic with respect to distance. For any
distance y, transportation cost is given by ty2. If a consumer buys a product posi-
tioned at a distance d away from its ideal point and priced at p, she gets a net utility
of V − p − td2, where V is the reservation price of this consumer for the product
and t (> 0) is the transportation cost parameter.
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9. Firms have rational expectations and discount second-period revenues by a factor δ
in first-period terms. They cannot store the product between periods. Once firms’
locations and prices are determined, the consumers have perfect information about
them. Consumers are rational in the sense that each consumer’s choice problem
is to purchase one product from either firm in each time period which maximizes
utility in that period, but we do not model the consumers to be forward looking.
3 Analysis
Because it is a multistage game, we use the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium
and analyze the decisions of firms and consumers in the reverse order to solve for the
equilibrium in prices and locations.
3.1 Case 1: θ = 0
Note that θ = 0 represents absence of variety seeking (a situation where consumer will-
ingness to pay in Period 2 is not based on what they bought last period). These results
are the benchmark against which our results must be compared. Let pA and pB be the
prices charged by the firms (same in both periods). For θ = 0, the model can be solved
to derive the following results. The details are provided in Appendix A.
pA = pB =
3
2
t. (1)
The equilibrium locations are at
a = −3
4
, (2)
b =
3
4
. (3)
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The equilibrium locations are symmetric so each firm captures half the market. The
equilibrium firm profits are,
πA = πB =
3
4
t. (4)
3.2 Case 2: θ > 0
We have a three period game (Period 0, 1 and 2). In Period 0, firms choose locations.
In Period 1, the consumers purchase the product which provides them with the highest
utility. Based on the utility of consumers, we can find the market share for Firm A and
Firm B by considering the marginal consumer, ex. The location of the marginal consumer
is given by,
V − pB1 − t (b− ex)2 = V − pA1 − t (ex− a)2 , (5)
where a and b are the equilibrium locations of the two firms. In Period 1, all consumers
to the left of the marginal consumer buy from Firm A where as all consumers to the right
of the marginal consumer buy from Firm B. In Period 2, Firm A sales comes from three
types of consumers:
• Type 1: Among the consumers whose reservation prices for the two products does
not change, consumers will buy from Firm A if buying from Firm A provides them
with higher utility in Period 2. These consumers equal (1− θ)
µ
1
2
+ a+b
2
+
pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a)
¶
.
• Type 2: Variety seeking consumers who purchased from Firm B in Period 1 and
whose utility is higher in Period 2 by buying from Firm A. This fraction of consumers
equal θ
µ
`+pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a) − p
B
1 −pA1
2t(b−a)
¶
2.
2We restrict our analysis to ` < 1.47t, so that the marginal consumers are located within the distri-
bution of consumers for all values of θ.
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• Type 3: Variety seeking consumers who do not gain utility by buying from Firm B
and continue to buy from Firm A. These consumers equal θ
µ
1
2
+ a+b
2
+
−`+pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a)
¶
.
Adding the demand from these three different types of consumers, total Firm A sales in
Period 2 denoted by qA2 is given by,
qA2 =
⎡⎣1
2
+
a+ b
2
− θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2t (b− a) +
(1 + θ)
³
pB2 − pA2
´
2t (b− a)
⎤⎦ . (6)
Similarly, Firm B sales in Period 2 can be expressed as,
qB2 =
⎡⎣1
2
− a+ b
2
+
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2t (b− a) −
(1 + θ)
³
pB2 − pA2
´
2t (b− a)
⎤⎦ . (7)
In the second period, firms choose pA2 and p
B
2 to maximize firm profits assuming loca-
tions and Period 1 prices to be given. As shown in Appendix B, we find pA2 and p
B
2 to be
as follows.
pA2 =
⎡⎣t (b− a)
(1 + θ)
+
t (b2 − a2)
3 (1 + θ)
− θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
3 (1 + θ)
⎤⎦ , (8)
pB2 =
⎡⎣t (b− a)
(1 + θ)
− t (b
2 − a2)
3 (1 + θ)
+
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
3 (1 + θ)
⎤⎦ . (9)
Working backwards, each firm will choose its Period 1 prices and locations to maximize
total profits, πiTotal :
πiTotal = π
i
1 + δπ
i
2, ∀ i = A,B. (10)
Solving we get (the details are in Appendix B),
b∗ =
3
4
− 1
4
Ã
δθ
1 + θ
!"
(9 + 6θ − 2δθ2 − 3θ2)
(27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2)
#
, (11)
a∗ = −3
4
+
1
4
Ã
δθ
1 + θ
!"
(9 + 6θ − 2δθ2 − 3θ2)
(27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2)
#
. (12)
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The equilibrium locations are symmetric. For all 0 < θ ≤ 1, and 0 < δ ≤ 1 the distance
between the equilibrium locations of the firms is less than the equilibrium location between
the firms when there are no variety seeking consumers present (θ = 0 case). This leads
to our first proposition:
Proposition 1 If θ > 0, then b < 3
4
and a > −3
4
. In other words, the presence of variety
seeking consumers, the firms differentiate less in the market.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Our results are consistent with the experimental findings in Van Trijp, Hoyer and
Inman (1996) who find support for the hypothesis that variety seeking behavior is more
likely to occur in situations where the perceived differences among the alternatives are
small. Our model suggests that this association may be observed due to the fact that
firms differentiate less in the presence of variety seeking consumers.
Kim and Serfes (2006) also find that differentiation reduces in equilibrium but they
analyze a model where some consumers buy from both firms in the same time period (i.e.,
buy a bundle). Said differently, they assume that some consumers treat both products
to be very similar. It therefore follows that firms also do not differentiate as much. We
analyze a model where consumers buy one product in each time period but get satiated
with what they bought earlier. Therefore variety seeking behavior results in differences
in willingness to pay where differences did not exist otherwise. Furthermore, we believe
that our formulation is more in line with the definition of variety seeking described in the
consumer behavior literature (e.g., McAlister 1982, Kahn, Kalwani and Morrison 1986).
10
We can now solve for Firm A and B prices in Period 1 and Period 2 in terms of θ and δ.
pA1 = p
B
1 =
2tb∗
(1 + θ)
∙
1 + θ +
2
3
δθ
¸
, (13)
pA2 = p
B
2 =
2tb∗
(1 + θ)
, (14)
where b∗ (in terms of θ and δ is given by the equation 11). This leads to our second
proposition:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric duopoly, if θ > 0, then pi1 > p
i and pi2 < p
i ∀ i = A,B.
Also,
pi1+p
i
2
2
< pi ∀ i = A,B.
Proof: See Appendix C.
This result is consistent with the notion that rear-loaded promotions may be more
beneficial to the firms in a variety seeking market (Zhang, Krishna, and Dhar, 2000). In
our model, even if a few customers seek variety (willingness to pay for the competing
product increases in Period 2), the equilibrium prices are lower in Period 2 than prices in
an identical market with no variety seeking consumers. As θ increases, prices in Period 2
decrease further. The primary reason is that firms realize that once consumers have made
their purchase in Period 1, the variety seeking consumers become “attractive targets” to
the competing firm. So, firms lower prices in Period 2 to decrease the attractiveness for
the competitor’s product and retain as many of the variety seeking consumers as possible.
Based on our previous two propositions, one may wonder as to why we observe both lower
differentiation and increased price competition in Period 2. The reason is that firms can
increase market share by either moving closer (by lowering differentiation) or by lowering
prices of their product. As one firm comes closer, its market share increases but the
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increased market share is coupled with an intensifying price competition. In our model,
as firms have the ability to charge different prices in the next period, firms use both the
mechanisms. But the extent to which firms use pricing or positioning changes to attract
consumers depends on the relative impact of these two opposing forces. Note that the
equilibrium location of each firm is still outside the unit interval within which consumer
preferences are uniformly distributed which seems to suggest that firms use lower prices
in Period 2 to a greater extent than decreasing differentiation to attract consumers.
We note that the effect of the presence of variety seeking consumers is not limited
to Period 2. It also affects the firms’ pricing decision in Period 1. Given that market
share in Period 1 is positively correlated with own sales in Period 2 in the presence of
variety seeking consumers, firms resort to lower price competition in Period 1 because
firms recognize that they have the flexibility to reduce prices in Period 2. Therefore,
higher prices in equilibrium are sustained in Period 1 as compared to the prices in an
identical market with no variety seeking consumers. Also, as the fraction θ increases,
Period 1 prices increase further. These results are represented graphically below.
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1fraction-variety seeking consumers
Figure 1: pi1 (above) & p
i
2 (below) as θ goes from 0 to 1 for i = A,B.
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The price decrease in Period 2 is greater than the increased prices that firms can
sustain in the market in Period 1. Therefore, the average price paid by the consumer
across the two time periods is lower than in a market without variety seeking consumers.
This is to be expected. When consumers exhibit less inertial tendencies (higher variety
seeking), we expect firm prices to reduce.
These results are different from those obtained in previous research. In both Klemperer
(1987) and Seetharaman and Che (2006), there is lower price competition in Period 2.
In the models presented in these papers, firms take advantage of the fact that the first
period provides an installed base of own customers and charge higher prices in Period 2.
3.2.1 Firm Profits
Another key question is what happens to firm profits and consumer surplus in the presence
of variety seeking consumers. Substituting equations (13) and (14) into equation (10) and
recognizing that each firm captures half of the market,
πiTotal =
1
2
h
pi1 + δp
i
2
i
, (15)
πiTotal =
1
2
2tb∗
(1 + θ)
∙
1 + θ + δ +
2
3
δθ
¸
. (16)
We show in Appendix D that πiTotal is less than the profits obtained by the firm in the
absence of variety seeking consumers. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In a symmetric duopoly, the presence of variety seeking consumers in the
market, reduces firm profits and increases consumer surplus.
Proof: See Appendix D.
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From the firms perspective, the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces the
market power of the firms to charge higher prices. The lower prices in Period 2 more than
offset the profits gained due to higher Period 1 prices. The presence of variety seeking
consumers also has a beneficial effect of increasing the aggregate consumer surplus. This
increase in consumer surplus is not restricted only to the variety seeking consumers but
is experienced by all consumers and therefore, the presence of variety seeking consumers
in any market is valuable to even those consumers who do not seek variety.
3.2.2 Variety Seeking vs. Observed Switching
Note that θ represents the fraction of variety seeking consumers. But all consumers who
seek variety do not actually purchase from different firms across the two time periods.
In other words, the level of switching observed in the market might be lower than the
inherent tendency among consumers to seek variety because firms can use their pricing
and positioning strategies to restrict variety seeking consumers from switching.
Let θs represent the fraction of consumers who actually buy from two different firms
across the two purchase occasions. We calculate θs (See Appendix E.) to be
θs
θ
=
"
`
t
# "
1− (27 + 33δθ + 6δθ
2 + 54θ + 27θ2 + 27δ − 4δ2θ2)
(2δθ + 3θ + 3δ + 3) (27 + 27θ − 4δθ2)
#
(17)
This leads to our final proposition:
Proposition 4 Not all variety seeking consumers in the market switch brands in equilib-
rium (θs
θ
≤ 1).
Proof: See Appendix E.
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An increase in ` spurs more of the variety seeking consumers to become switchers.
Although firms tries to prevent variety seeking consumers from switching in Period 2 by
lowering prices, firms’ pricing is less effective in preventing switching as ` increases. This
leads to higher observed brand switching. We can also represent θs
θ
by the following.
θs
θ
=
`
t (b∗ − a∗) , (18)
which implies that as actual differentiation in equilibrium decreases, observed switching
increases. Note that a lower t is also indicative of lower differentiation between the two
firms and leads to higher observed switching. The intuition for this result is that as dif-
ferentiation decreases, variety seeking consumers require a lower threshold in incremental
utility to purchase from the competing firm and consequently switching increases among
those who seek variety. Proposition 4 cautions that the observed switching behavior may
not fully capture the inherent variety seeking tendency.
4 Summary, Limitations and Future Research
We study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek
variety. Variety seeking behavior is modeled as an increase in the willingness-to-pay for the
product not purchased on the previous purchase occasion. Using a three stage Hotelling
type model, we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product
differentiation offered in equilibrium. Furthermore, we find that the observed switching
in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking
tendencies among consumers. We also show that the presence of variety seeking consumers
leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus. Another key idea presented
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in this paper is that in the presence of variety seeking consumers, price competition
is different than what has been suggested in previous research. We show that price
competition is lower in Period 1 and it is higher in Period 2 and the intensity of price
competition depends on the fraction of the variety seeking consumers.
We made a number of simplifying assumptions. We assumed that consumers are
not forward looking. Forward looking consumers might be able to rationally exploit the
marketing tactics of firms to increase consumer surplus further. We assumed that the
incremental utility that a consumer gains is independent of the previous purchase choice.
We assumed symmetric firms, but in the real world firms differ in their ability to make
their products more attractive to the competitor’s customers. We also assumed that
fraction of variety seeking consumers are exogenous to the model. There is some evidence
in the literature that variety seeking tendency among consumers is affected by marketing
mix variables like in-store display (Simonson and Winer 1992) or featured advertisements
(Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta 1999). Relaxing these assumptions is likely to
provide interesting opportunities for future research.
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Magazine Name # of issues/year Subscription Price Renewal Price
Reader’s Digest 12 $13.62 $9.98
Children’s Technology Review 12 $96.00 $64.00
Newsweek 51 $20.00 $18.99
Public Utilities Fortnightly 26 $169.00 $84.50
Table 1: Subscription and Renewal Prices3
3Subscription and renewal prices are from official websites and not from third party resellers. Excludes
trial period.
17
References
Bass, F., E. A. Pessemier, D. R. Lehmann. 1972. An Experimental Study of Relation-
ships Between Attitudes, Brand Preference and Choice. Behavioral Science. 17
(November) 532-541.
Desai, P. S., D. Purohit. 1999. Competition in Durable Goods Markets: The Strategic
Consequences of Leasing and Selling. Marketing Science. 18(1) 42-58.
Feinberg, F. M., B. E. Kahn, L. McAlister. 1992. Market Share Response When Con-
sumers Seek Variety. Journal of Marketing Research. 29(2) 227-237.
Givon, M. 1984. Variety Seeking Through Brand Switching. Marketing Science. 3(1)
1-21.
Hotelling, H. 1929. Stability in competition. Economic Journal. 39, 41-57.
Kahn, B. E., M. U. Kalwani, D. G. Morrison. 1986. Measuring Variety-Seeking and
Reinforcement Behaviors Using Panel Data. Journal of Marketing Research. 23(2)
89-100.
Kahn, B. E., J. S. Raju. 1991. Effects of Price Promotions on Variety-Seeking and
Reinforcement Behavior. Marketing Science. 10(4) 316-337.
Kim, B-D., M. Shi, K. Srinivasan. 2001. Reward Programs and Tacit Collusion. Mar-
keting Science. 20(2) 99-120.
Kim, H., K. Serfes. 2006. A Location Model with Preference for Variety. Journal of
Industrial Economics. 54(4) 569-595.
18
Klemperer, P. 1987. The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs. RAND
Journal of Economics. 18(1) 138-150.
Lattin, J. M., L. McAlister. 1985. Using a Variety-Seeking Model to Identify Substi-
tute and Complementary Relationships Among Competing Products. Journal of
Marketing Research. 22(4) 330-339.
McAlister, L. (1982). A Dynamic Attribute Satiation Model of Variety-Seeking Behavior,
Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (3) 141-150.
Seetharaman, P. B., H. Che. 2006. Price Competition in Markets with Consumer Variety
Seeking. Marketing Science (forthcoming)
Seetharaman, P. B., A. Ainslie, P. K. Chintagunta. 1999. Investigating Household
State Dependence Effects Across Categories. Journal of Marketing Research. 36(4)
488-500.
Simonson, I., R.S. Winer. 1992. The Influence of Purchase Quantity and Display Format
on Consumer Preference for Variety. Journal of Consumer Research. 19(2) 133-138.
Tabuchi, T., J. F. Thisse. 1995. Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization. 13 213-227.
Trivedi, M., F. M. Bass, R.C. Rao.1994. A Model of Stochastic Variety-Seeking. Mar-
keting Science. 13(3) 274-297.
Tyagi, R. K., 2000. Sequential Product Positioning Under Differential Costs. Manage-
ment Science. 46(7) 928-940.
19
Van Trijp, H. C. M., W. D. Hoyer, J. J. Inman. 1996. Why Switch? Product Cate-
gory: Level Explanations for True Variety-Seeking Behavior. Journal of Marketing
Research. 33(3) 281-292.
Zhang, Z. J., A. Krishna, S. K. Dhar. 2000. The Optimal Choice of Promotion Vehicles:
Front-loaded or Rear-loaded Incentives?. Management Science, 46(3) 348-362.
20
Technical Appendix
Appendix A
For θ = 0, we have a two stage model. The marginal consumer is located at p
B−pA+b2−a2
2t(b−a) .
Using this, Firm A market share =
h
1
2
+ p
B−pA+b2−a2
2t(b−a)
i
and Firm B market share =h
1
2
− pB−pA+b2−a2
2t(b−a)
i
.
Firm A profits are given by πA = pA
h
1
2
+ p
B−pA+b2−a2
2t(b−a)
i
. Firm A will choose pA to maxi-
mize profits. Therefore, dπ
A
dpA
= 0. Similarly, dπ
B
dpB
= 0.
Solving these simultaneously, we get
pA =
t
3
h
3 (b− a) +
³
b2 − a2
´i
(A.1)
pB =
t
3
h
3 (b− a)−
³
b2 − a2
´i
(A.2)
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the firms profit function and realizing that
firms choose locations to maximize profits, we have dπ
A
da
= 0. Similarly, dπ
B
da
= 0. Solving
we get, a = −3
4
and b = 3
4
. Substituting the equlibrium locations into (A.1) and (A.2),
we get pA = pB = 3
2
t . Therefore, πA = πB = 3
4
t.
Appendix B
For θ > 0, we can write the Firm A profits in Period 2 as follows:
πA2 =
³
pA2
´ ³
qA2
´
= pA2
⎡⎣1
2
+
a+ b
2
+
³
pB2 − pA2
´
(1 + θ)
2t (b− a) −
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2t (b− a)
⎤⎦ (B.1)
Firm A will choose pA2 to maximize Firm A profits in Period 2. Therefore,
dπA2
dpA2
= 0.
Solving, we get
pA2 =
t (b− a)
2 (1 + θ)
+
t (b2 − a2)
2 (1 + θ)
+
pB2
2
− θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2 (1 + θ)
(B.2)
21
Similarly,
πB2 =
³
pB2
´ ³
qB2
´
= pB2
⎡⎣1
2
− a+ b
2
−
³
pB2 − pA2
´
(1 + θ)
2t (b− a) +
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2t (b− a)
⎤⎦ (B.3)
Firm B will choose pB2 to maximize Firm B profits in Period 2. Therefore,
dπB2
dpB2
= 0.
Solving, we get
pB2 =
t (b− a)
2 (1 + θ)
− t (b
2 − a2)
2 (1 + θ)
+
pA2
2
+
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
2 (1 + θ)
(B.4)
Solving the expressions for pA2 and p
B
2 simultaneously, we get
pA2 =
t (b− a)
(1 + θ)
+
t (b2 − a2)
3 (1 + θ)
− θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
3 (1 + θ)
(B.5)
pB2 =
t (b− a)
(1 + θ)
− t (b
2 − a2)
3 (1 + θ)
+
θ
³
pB1 − pA1
´
3 (1 + θ)
(B.6)
In the first period, firms will also choose pA1 and p
B
1 to maximize total profits πATotal and
πBTotal.
Now,
πATotal = p
A
1
"
1
2
+
a+ b
2
+
pB1 − pA1
2t (b− a)
#
+ δπA2 (B.7)
where
πA2 =
∙
t(b−a)
(1+θ)
+
t(b2−a2)
3(1+θ)
− θ(pB1 −pA1 )
3(1+θ)
¸ ∙
1
2
+ a+b
2
− θ(pB1 −pA1 )
2t(b−a) +
(1+θ)
2t(b−a)
µ
2θ(pB1 −pA1 )
3(1+θ)
− 2t(b2−a2)
3(1+θ)
¶¸
Solving, dπA
dpA1
= 0, we get
pA1 =
1
2
(9tb+9tbθ−9ta−9taθ−9ta2−9ta2θ+9tb2+9tb2θ+9pB1 +9θpB1 +6δθtb−6δθta−2δθta2+2δθtb2−2δθ2pB1 )
(9+9θ−δθ2)
Similarly, solving, dπBTotal
dpB1
= 0, we get
pB1 =
1
2
(9tb+9tbθ−9ta−9taθ+9ta2+9ta2θ−9tb2−9tb2θ+6δθtb−6δθta+9pA1 +9θpA1 −2δθ2pA1 +2δθta2−2δθtb2)
(9+9θ−δθ2)
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Solving these simultaneous equations, we can get pA1 and p
B
1 in terms of a, b, θ and δ. As
firms also choose locations endogenously, we also have dπATotal
da
= 0 and dπBTotal
db
= 0.
Substituting the value of pA1 and p
B
1 and solving for the symmetric equilibrium, we get
b∗ =
1
4
(2δθ + 3θ + 3δ + 3) (27 + 27θ − 4δθ2)
(θ + 1) (27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2) (B.8)
a∗ = −1
4
(2δθ + 3θ + 3δ + 3) (27 + 27θ − 4δθ2)
(θ + 1) (27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2) (B.9)
which can be rearranged to get equations (11) and (12).
Now
b∗ − a∗ = 3
2
− 1
2
Ã
δθ
1 + θ
!"
(9 + 6θ − 2δθ2 − 3θ2)
(27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2)
#
(B.10)
As can be clearly seen, (b∗ − a∗) < 3
2
for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1. So equilibrium
firm differentiation decreases. The variation in differentiation as the fraction of variety
seeking consumers increases is represented graphically below:
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Appendix C
Substituting the equilibrium locations into the expressions for pA1 and p
B
1 we can solve
for pA1 and p
B
1 in terms of θ and δ. Simplifying, we get
pA1 = p
B
1 =
1
6
t (2δθ + 3θ + 3) (2δθ + 3θ + 3δ + 3) (27 + 27θ − 4δθ2)
(θ + 1)2 (27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2) (C.1)
We have to show that pi1 > p
i for i = A,B.
Now pi = 3
2
t and pi1 =
2tb∗(2δθ+3θ+3)
3(1+θ)
. We have to show that 2tb
∗(2δθ+3θ+3)
3(1+θ)
> 3
2
t
i.e. b∗ (2δθ + 3θ + 3) > 9
4
(1 + θ)
i.e. 3
³
b∗ − 3
4
´
+ 3θ
³
b∗ − 3
4
´
+ b∗ (2δθ)
which is always true for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1.
Similar to above, we can substitute the equilibrium locations and solve for pA2 and p
B
2 in
terms of θ and δ. Simplifying, we get
pA2 = p
B
2 =
t
2
(2δθ + 3θ + 3δ + 3) (27 + 27θ − 4δθ2)
(θ + 1)2 (27 + 27θ + 27δ + 24δθ − 4δ2θ2 − 6δθ2) (C.2)
We have to show that pi2 < p
i for i = A,B.
Now pi = 3
2
t and pi2 =
2tb∗
(1+θ)
. We have to show that 2tb
∗
(1+θ)
< 3
2
t.
i.e.
³
3
4
− b∗
´
+ 3
4
θ > 0
which is always true for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1.
Let us now look at the average prices.
Average prices in a variety seeking market =
pi1+p
i
2
2
= tb
∗
(1+θ)
h
2 + θ + 2
3
δθ
i
Average prices in a market with no variety seeking = 3
2
t
To show that the average prices are lower in a variety seeking market, we have to show
that
tb∗
(1 + θ)
∙
2 + θ +
2
3
δθ
¸
<
3
2
t (C.3)
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i.e. (2 + θ)
³
3
4
− b∗
´
+ θ
h
3
4
− 2
3
δb∗
i
> 0
which is always true for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1.
Appendix D
Using (10), the equilibrium firm profits in a variety seeking market is given by
πiTotal =
tb∗
(1 + θ)
∙
1 + θ +
2
3
δθ
¸
+ δ
tb∗
(1 + θ)
(D.1)
In a market with no variety seeking, firm profits = 3
4
t (1 + δ). To show that equlibrium
firm profits are lower in a variety seeking market, we have to show that
tb∗
(1 + θ)
∙
1 + θ + δ +
2
3
δθ
¸
<
3
4
t (1 + δ) (D.2)
i.e. (1 + θ + δ)
³
3
4
− b∗
´
+ δθ
³
3
4
− 2
3
b∗
´
> 0
which is always true for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1. Also, as firm make lower profits in
equilibrium, consumer surplus increases.
Appendix E
By looking at the marginal consumer, the fraction of consumers who purchase from Firm
B in Period 1 and purchase from Firm A in Period 2 is given by θ
µ
`+pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a) − p
B
1 −pA1
2t(b−a)
¶
.
Again, by looking at the marginal consumer, the fraction of consumers who purchase from
Firm A in Period 2 and purchase from Firm B in Period 2 is given by θ
µ
`+pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a) − p
B
1 −pA1
2t(b−a)
¶
.
Therefore the total fraction of observed switchers is given by 2θ
µ
`+pB2 −pA2
2t(b−a) − p
B
1 −pA1
2t(b−a)
¶
. Rec-
ognizing that pB1 = p
A
1 and p
B
2 = p
A
2 in equilibrium, we get
θs
θ
=
`
t (b∗ − a∗) (E.1)
Substituting, the values for the equilibrium locations and rearranging, we get (17).
As (b∗ − a∗) < 3
2
and for ` < 1.47t, we will have θs
θ
< 1.
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